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Pension Plan Exception After McMann and the 1978
Amendments
I. Introduction
In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)' in an effort to resolve the problem of discriminatory employment
practices against older Americans and to promote the employment of members
of that group.' As a result of the ADEA, discrimination based on age in the
areas of hiring, firing, and compensating workers became unlawful.'
Within the broad scope of the ADEA, however, certain exceptions were
created.' Among these exceptions is the so-called pension plan exception. This
provision allows employers to observe the terms of bona fide pension plans
provided that such plans are not used as subterfuges to avoid the purposes of the
ADEA.' This exception was originally interpreted by the courts' and the Labor
Department' as authorizing the involuntary early retirement of workers covered
by such plans. By giving the pension plan exception a plain reading and ignor-
ing the legislative history of the exception, the courts interpreted the exception
as authorizing the forced retirement of workers before age sixty-five if such re-
tirement was permitted under a pension plan.8 Such mandatory retirement,
therefore, did not violate the ADEA. Congress has recently reacted to this
judicial interpretation of the ADEA in the 1978 amendments to the ADEA.
Those amendments added language to the pension plan exception that prevents
the use of a pension plan to force involuntary retirement before age seventy.9
Although the 1978 amendments effectively end the controversy over
whether the pension plan exception authorizes mandatory early retirement, the
amendments do not prevent an employer from discriminating against older
workers' in awarding benefits under such pension plans. Specifically, the 1978
amendments shift the focus of interpretation to the subterfuge clause of the-
pension plan exception. Instead of deciding whether mandatory retirement is
permitted by the pension plan exception, the courts will have to determine
1 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1970).
2 "It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arsing from the impact of age
on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
3 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1970).
4 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1970).
5 An employer may "observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system, or any bona fide
employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such plan shall excuse the failure
to hire any individual." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1970).
6 See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
7 29 C.F.R. 860.110 (1969).
8 See 434 U.S. 192.
9 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2,
92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1970)).
10 The term "older worker" refers to anyone between the ages of forty and seventy. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2, 92 Stat.
189 (amending 29 U.S.C. 623(f) (2) (1970)).
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whether a particular action by an employer in granting differential benefits to
older workers is a subterfuge of the ADEA.
This note will examine the history of the pension plan exception in the
Congress and the courts in an effort to assess the probable future of that section.
In addition, the note will propose some factors that should be considered in
deciding whether a particular case of differential treatment under an employee
benefit plan is a subterfuge of the ADEA. Since a significant portion of the
American labor force may be covered by such employee benefit plans," the in-
terpretation of the pension plan exception and the subterfuge clause has a
potentially far-reaching impact.
II. Congress and the Pension Plan Exception
The ADEA prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an older worker
solely on the basis of that worker's age. 2 Likewise, the employer may not dis-
criminate against an older worker in granting any employee benefits because of
age." The dilemma of an employer with any employee retirement or benefit
plan is clear. He must hire the older worker who is close to the age at which
that worker would be eligible to receive the plan's benefits. At the same time,
the employer must accord to that older worker the same benefits given to a
younger worker who will eventually make more contributions to the plan.
One reason Congress originally adopted the pension plan exception to the
ADEA was to obviate this dilemma. Under the exception, the employer could
hire an older person without being forced to grant that person the same benefits
as a younger employee. The economic capacity of pension plans to provide for
those persons already covered was thereby preserved. 4 Additionally, employers
were given an economic incentive to hire older persons. Congress was, therefore,
advancing the dual purpose of fostering the vitality of employee benefit plans
while promoting the employment of older Americans.
This view of the pension plan exception was included in the House Com-
mittee Report on the original ADEA: "This exception serves to emphasize the
primary purpose of the bill-hiring of older workers-by permitting employment
without necessarily including such workers in employee benefit plans."" The
Committee felt that the exception provided a feasible method for employers to
maintain such plans while complying with the ADEA's mandate to hire older
workers.
The Senate floor manager of the original ADEA, Senator Yarborough, took
the same view. In response to questioning on the Senate floor, he explained the
exception to mean "that a man who would not have been hired except for this
11 See, e.g., Bell, Prevalence of Private Retirement Plans, 98 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 17
(Oct. 1975), which indicates that the majority of office workers are covered by pension plans.
12 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1970).
13 Id.
14 H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967), reprinted in (1967) U.S. CoDE &
AD. NEws 2213, 2217.
15 Id. See also 113 CONG. REc. 34752 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Dwyer); 113 CONG.




law does not have to receive the benefits of the plan."' 6 Considering the case of
a fifty-five-year-old applicant, he said, "[The applicant] cannot be denied em-
ployment because he is 55, but he will not be able to participate in that pension
plan because unlike a man hired at 44, he has no chance to earn 20 years re-
tirement."-"
In spite of these expressions of Congressional intent concerning the mean-
ing of the pension plan exception, the courts took a different view, one which
Congress never seemed to consider. In deciding cases in which workers were
involuntarily retired under pension plans, the courts found that the plain lan-
guage of the pension plan exception allowed employers to force older workers into
early retirement if the pension plans provided for such retirement.' Since em-
ployers were allowed to observe the terms of employee benefit plans which were
not subterfuges to evade the ADEA, the courts reasoned that workers could be
forced into early retirement under plans allowing for such mandatory retirement.
III. Judicial Attitudes Toward the ADEA and the Original
Pension Plan Exception
In deciding the mandatory retirement cases, the only cases which have yet
interpreted the pension plan exception, most courts have engaged in a two-step
process. First, they have given the pension plan exception a plain reading, 9
refusing to examine legislative history as a guide to interpretation. Second, they
attempted to identify various factors which would aid in determining whether a
particular benefit plan was a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA.
Both of these characteristics are importafilt in assessing the future of the
pension plan exception after the 1978 amendments to the ADEA. The first
indicates a judicial attitude of disfavor toward arguments interpreting the pension
plan exception through reference to legislative history. The second issue, the
subterfuge clause, survives the 1978 amendments. 0
The retirement cases indicate that the courts are reluctant to go beyond the
language contained in the pension plan exception in interpreting that section.
Two early cases, which were decided on other grounds, Grossfield v. Saunder"
and Stringfellow v. Monsanto," merely assumed that the pension plan exception
authorized mandatory retirement without discussing the issue.
Other courts have been more explicit in adopting the plain language
doctrine when interpreting the pension plan exception. These courts have refused
16 113 CONG. REC. 31255 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough).
17 Id.
18 E.g., 434 U.S. 192.
19 A detailed discussion of the plain reading doctrine is beyond the scope of this note.
Further treatment of this doctrine may be found in, several places including Schegman v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) and Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUmn. L. REv. 527 (1947).
20 The 1978 amendments only add the phrase, "and no such seniority system or employee
benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual" at the end
of the original text of § 623(f) (2). Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2, 92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970)).
21 1 LAB. REL. REP. 624, 1 E.D.P. 9941 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
22 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
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to go beyond the words of the section even where faced with arguments based on
the stated legislative purpose and legislative history of the ADEA. In Brennan v.
Taft Broadcasting,"2 an employee elected to join defendant's retirement plan. He
was notified later that he would have to retire at age sixty. Plaintiff argued that
the legislative history indicated that the pension plan exception was only meant
to protect the fiscal integrity of such plans and not to permit involuntary re-
tirement. In rejecting this argument, the court found the pension plan exception
to be unambiguous on its face.24 Resort to legislative history was, therefore, un-
warranted. The dissenting judge, however, found that the exception was poorly
written. Applying'a different canon of legislative interpretation, he felt that, as
an exception to the ADEA, it should be narrowly construed.2"
This restrictive attitude toward the pension plan exception was approved
by the Supreme Court in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann.2 6 In addressing
arguments similar to those in Taft, the Court said that the traditional canons
of interpretation precluded an examination of the legislative history of an un-
ambiguous statute.2 "
Although this plain language canon of interpretation has the advantage of
consistency and predictability, it suffers from two major defects in this context.
First, it forces the courts to misconstrue the intent of Congress in passing the
ADEA. Although legislative intent is often difficult to ascertain, the legislative
purpose of the ADEA is contained within the statute itself.28 That purpose is to
promote the employment of older workers. A reading of the pension plan excep-
tion which allows for involuntary retirement is obviously antithetical to this
purpose. Second, the courts which have employed the plain reading canon have,
in fact, read the pension plan exception out of the context of the ADEA. As
the dissenting judge in Taft argued, this section must be read as a part of the
entire ADEA."9 An out-of-context reading gives rise to the possibility of illogical
results, as Justice Marshall argued in his dissent in McMann. Marshall main-
tained that an integrated reading of the statute was necessary. He felt that the
majority's interpretation of the pension plan exception would allow an employer
to force a worker into early retirement, but the employer would have to rehire
that same person upon reapplication under a different provision of the ADEA.3"
Despite the value of such arguments and the enactment of the 1978 amend-
ments which ended the mandatory retirement issue, the retirement cases indicate
that the courts will continue to give a plain reading to the pension plan exception
in interpreting the remaining issue, i.e., the interpretation of the subterfuge
clause.
23 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
24 Id. at 217.
25 Id. at 220 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
26 434 U.S. 192.
27 Id. at 199. The Court, however, did go on to examine the legislative history to support
its conclusion. Id. at 199-202.
28 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
29 500 F.2d at 220 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
qnf 434 TT.. at 208 (Marshall. .1.. dissenting).
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IV. Congressional Response to McMann
After the judicial interpretations of the pension plan exception allowed the
involuntary early retirement of older workers pursuant to employee pension plans,
several members of Congress, believing that those interpretations were incorrect,
introduced measures to restore what they felt was the original intent of the
pension plan exception."' These efforts culminated in the 1978 amendments to
the ADEA. That legislation added language to the pension plan exception
prohibiting involuntary early retirement. 2 The Conference Report indicates
that the language added to the pension plan exception is meant to correct the
interpretation of that section by the McMann. court.3
The 1978 amendments, however, leave an important question of interpreta-
tion of the pension plan exception unresolved. Although the issue of mandatory
retirement of older workers was settled, the amendments did not affect the ability
of employers to grant unequal benefits under pension plans that are not sub-
terfuges to evade the purposes of the ADEA. Instead of deciding whether the
pension plan exception allows for mandatory retirement, the courts will now
have to concentrate on interpreting the subterfuge clause of the pension plan
exception in future cases of discriminatory awards of benefits.
V. The Subterfuge Clause
Because the 1978 amendments only add language to the pension plan ex-
ception that prohibits mandatory retirement under pension plans, employers will
still be able to observe the terms of benefit plans which discriminate against older
workers, provided that such plans are not subterfuges to avoid the ADEA. The
question whether a particular plan is a subterfuge of the ADEA has, to date,
only arisen in the involuntary retirement cases. Although the mandatory retire-
ment issue under the pension plan exception is now settled, these cases also
indicate several factors which may be important in determining whether future
cases of differential benefits violate the ADEA.
In interpreting the subterfuge clause in the retirement cases, three tests have
been used by the courts: the sufficiency of benefits test, the chronological test, and
the business purpose test.
The sufficiency of benefits test was applied in Dunlop v. Hawaiian Tele-
phone Co.3" In determining whether the forced early retirement of an employee,
pursuant to the terms of a pension plan, was a subterfuge of the ADEA, the court
looked to the amount of the benefits that the employee would receive under the
plan. Since the payments to the employee would be substantial, the court con-
cluded that the conduct of the employer was not a subterfuge of the ADEA.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Labor Department regula-
tions that permitted the mandatory retirement of an individual covered by a
plan, but forbade the retirement of a nonmember." The sole reason the court
31 E.g., 123 CONG. REc. S17274 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 123
CONG. REC. H9354 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Weiss).
32 See note 20 supra.
33 H. R. CONF. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
34 415 F. Supp. 330, 332-33 (D. Hawaii 1976).
35 29 C.F.R. 860.110 (1969).
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could see for such differential treatment was that the plan member would receive
payments under the plan. 6 It concluded, therefore, that the ADEA meant to
focus on the sufficiency of benefits received."
This approach is laudable in its attempt to insure the economic survival of
the worker." The sufficiency of benefits, however, is probably better cast as a
factor to determine whether the pension plan is a bona fide one, as required by
the ADEA, and not whether the plan is a subterfuge. 9 A plan may provide the
retiree with adequate benefits, but still be used in a discriminatory fashion.
In adopting the benefits test, the Dunlop court refused to follow the chron-
ological approach of Taft. The Taft case, as previously discussed, involved the
mandatory retirement of an individual under a pension plan which pre-dated
the ADEA. The Taft court held it was impossible for any plan that preceded
the enactment of the ADEA to be an evasion of the statute. Any notion that the
plan was a subterfuge of the ADEA was therefore eliminated."
This chronological approach was rejected by the Fourth Circuit in McMann
v. United Air Lines, Inc.41 In McMann, the Taft reasoning was rejected because
the text of the pension plan exception refers to a plan that is a subterfuge of the
purposes of the ADEA. Although a plan pre-dating the ADEA could not be
a subterfuge of the ADEA, per se, the Fourth Circuit held that such a plan could
be used to evade the purposes of the ADEA.4 Therefore, the court employed an
economic purpose test. It required the defendant to show some economic or
business purpose for its action. In this way, the court attempted to conform to the
legislative intent discussed earlier."
On review, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that
the chronological test of Taft applied. In defining the subterfuge clause, the
Court stated that the clause referred to "a scheme, plan, strategem, or artifice
of evasion"" in the plain meaning of the term. Further, the Court merely
assumed that Congress must have intended to use that term in its ordinary
meaning.45 Therefore, a plan established before the passage of the ADEA could
not be a subterfuge of a statute not in existence at the time of the plan's establish-
ment.
In passing the 1978 amendments, Congress clearly intended to overrule that
part of the McMann opinion interpreting the pension plan exception as author-
izing involuntary retirement. Congress also repudiated the chronological test
adopted by the McMann court: "Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of
enactment are not exempt under section 4 (f) (2) by virtue of the fact that they
36 415 F. Supp. at 332-33.
37 Id.
38 Note, The Problem of Involuntary Retirement Before Age 65, 60 MARQ. L. Rav. 1053
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Involuntary Retirement].
39 The Dunlop approach was probably overruled by the Supreme Court in McMann. See
text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
40 500 F.2d at 215.
41 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976).
42 See also Involuntary Retirement, supra note 38; Note, Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REy. 924 (1975) (similar interpretations of the exception are made).
43 Cf., 434 U.S. at 204 (White, J., concurring) (similar discussion of business purpose
test).




antedate the act or these amendments."4 McMann's emphasis on the intent of
the employer in determining whether a particular plan is a subterfuge of the
ADEA, however, was left untouched. The subterfuge language was retained by
Congress in the ADEA. Given the "plain reading" history of the pension plan
exception, the courts will probably continue to focus on that portion of the
McMann opinion defining the subterfuge clause in terms of employer intent.
Several factors can therefore be identified as guides in deciding whether an em-
ployer has intentionally discriminated against older workers in granting differ-
ential benefits under pension plans.
One initial factor to be considered is whether the employee benefit plan in
question was the product of collective bargaining. This consideration was given
weight in two ADEA retirement cases, Thompson v. Chrysler Corp.47 and
Steiner v. National League of Professional Baseball,8 although both decisions
rested upon other grounds. 9 This factor should be extremely probative of an
employer's intent to evade the ADEA. If a plan has been the subject of genuine
collective bargaining between a union and an employer, the inference that any
discriminatory terms resulted from the employer's intent to evade the ADEA is
obviously weak. Discrimination under a plan that evolved from collective
bargaining should not be found to be a subterfuge of the ADEA absent a strong
showing to the contrary. This view of collectively bargained plans is supported by
the special exemption from the higher retirement age created in the 1978 amend-
ments." Congress, therefore, believed that such plans deserved special treatment.
A second factor, present in some of the retirement cases, is whether the
differential treatment is within the discretion of the employer. The vesting of
discretion with the employer to extend his affiliation with his employee beyond
the plan's retirement age was specifically approved in Steiner." In that case,
plaintiff had been permitted by defendant to continue working one year after
the retirement age. He was later retired when his job rating fell. Although the
court approved this action as nondiscriminatory, in comparison to other em-
ployees who continued working for several years after the retirement age, a
conscious decision on the employer's part to withhold benefits from an older
worker may indicate that the plan is merely a device to attempt to legitimize
otherwise discriminatory treatment. This would be especially true if the employer
routinely uses such discretion to withhold benefits from older workers.
Although this factor may give some inference of employer intent to unlaw-
fully discriminate, it should only be a threshold inquiry. Such discrimination
may be for valid reasons, such as job performance or other business reasons. When
the decision is within the employer's discretion, the next inquiry should be
whether there exists any independent justifications for the discriminatory treat-
46 See note 33 supra.
47 406 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
48 377 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
49 406 F. Supp. at 1217. See also Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical, and
Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimination Laws in Employment, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 839 (1975);
Involuntary Retirement, supra note 38.
50 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, §
2, 92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1970)).
51 406 F. Supp. at 1217.
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ment. If there are none, the inference that the employer is using the plan to avoid
giving equal benefits to older workers may remain.
The McMann court refused to place the initial burden of justifying the
discriminatory treatment on the employer."2 If a plaintiff can show that the
decision to accord differential treatment rested with the employer, however, an
intent to unlawfully discriminate may be implied. If no other reasons justifying
the discrimination exist, then an intent to discriminate may be inferred. The
discretion factor alone should not be determinative. It is the discretion plus the
absence of other justifications that is probative of employer intent.
A third factor to be considered is whether the employer gains any economic
benefits from the discriminatory treatment. In Taft, the court found that the
employer's costs remained the same regardless of any differential treatment of
older workers.53 The employer had no real incentive to discriminate. When an
employer's costs would be lessened by granting lower benefits to older workers, the
employer has an obvious incentive to violate the ADEA. When such an
economic incentive is present, therefore, a strong inference that the employer is
merely using the plan to evade the ADEA's purpose of providing equal treatment
to older workers is present.
A related factor is whether the discriminatory treatment is necessary to the
economic health of the benefit plan. As previously discussed, this factor was part
of the original motivation behind the pension plan exception in Congress.54 If
the differential treatment is for this reason, the employer's action should be auto-
matically valid, given such Congressional intent, unless it can be shown that the
plan was intentionally designed to give the employer this escape valve for dif-
ferential treatment.
Of course, any other type of evidence tending to establish that an employer
intended to evade the ADEA through the use of an employee benefit plan must
be considered. Each fact tending to show such intent must be balanced against
possible business reasons for the differential treatment and the Congressional
purpose to promote equal treatment for. all workers regardless of age.
VI. Conclusion
The ADEA has the laudable purpose of promoting the employment and
equal treatment of older workers. In the past, the pension plan exception
threatened to be the exception that swallowed the rule. The 1978 amendments
have returned the pension plan exception to its original role as a part of the
overall legislative scheme. The courts will now be faced with the problem of
applying the subterfuge clause of the exception to particular cases of discrimi-
natory treatment. McMann's focus on employer intent, absent the chronological
considerations, is the best way to effectuate the Congressional purpose. A forth-
right judicial examination of employer intent in future cases is needed to define
the scope of the pension plan exception.
-Thomas W. Millet
52 434 U.S. at 203.
53 500 F.2d at 214.
54 See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
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